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DAMAGES IN THE PUBLICIZATION OF TURNPIKES.
The act of June 2d, 1887,' makes provision for the rendering public and toliless of turnpikes, or parts of turnpikes in any
county on the payment of damages by the county. The object
of this discussion is to examine the tests which have been
adopted for the ascertainment of the amount of these damages.
When the public exappropriate a turnpike company, of what
do they deprive it? It does not own the land in fee, over which
the road runs, and it is not, therefore deprived of the fee. It has
a species of easement in the land. This easement consists in the
right to occupy the surface, to grade it, to spread over it gravel,
sand, stonds or other substances, to construct culverts and bridges
over streams or depressions, in order to make it practicable for
vehicles, horses or pedestrians. This easement is usually of indefinite duration, although it is subject to termination at any
time, by the exercise.by the public of the statutory power to render the road toll-less, or by the exercise of the right, sometimes
reserved in the charter, to the commonwealth or county, to purchase it and the property upon the road, at a price to be ascertained in a specified mode. 2 This easement, having been acquired from the owners of lands over which the road is laid, has
cost the turnpike company the money or other considerations
which it was compelled to pay, as damages, or as price, to these
owners.
In addition to the easement in the land, the turnpike company may be thought to own the sand, gravel, stones, which it
has spread over the surface. It has spent money in procuring
'P. L. 3o6; 2 Pa. L. Dig. 4765. When the bridge spans a stream which
divides counties, the damages are to be imposed in equal parts upon them.
2Cf. Lock Haven Bridge Co. v. Clinton County, 157 Pa. 379.
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them, in hauling them to the proper places, and in properly laying them thereat. It has bought the stones used in the construction of culverts and aqueducts, and paid for the mason work.
It has purchased the timbers used in the building of bridges, and
In a sense, it is the
paid for the process of construction.
But ownership is the legal power
owner of these things.
of control, to the exclusion of interference by others, and the
breadth of this power is capable of indefinite variation. An
owner in severalty has a wider control than one of several tenants in common. The power of an owner in fee exceeds that of
a tenant for years, or that of one who has a mere servitude.
If compensation is to be made for property, regard must not
be had of the value of an estate therein, which is larger than
that possessed by the person to be compensated. Where the state
takes land by the eminent domain, it does not pay the life tenant
of it, the worth of a fee; or the owner of an undivided half of it,
the value of both halves, or the owner of a right of way across
it, the value of the maximum estate. In determining what the
turnpike company should receive, on the supersedure of its control of the road on account of its so-called property, it is, hence,
necessary to consider the scope of that property.
Has, then, the company as full an ownership of the stones,
gravel, asphalt, composing the bed of the road, of the masonwork of the bridges and culverts, and of the wood, iron and stone
of the bridges, or of the bridges considered as composite units, as
the ordinary owner has of his real or personal property? Plainly
not. To a degree, the company may doubtless take off some of
the stones. It may destroy the culverts and bridges, but only to
a degree, and subject to the condition of furnishing substitutes.
For the purpose of better adapting the road to public use, of
making it, its culverts and bridges more durable, commodious
and safe, the company may remove and dispose as it will of the
stone, iron and wood, substituting for them other material, built
into the road, the culverts and bridges in a better way. But the
company surely cannot lawfully degrade the character of its road
by withdrawing, without substitution of others, some of its essential components. When it builds the road, it finally dedicates
the material and work employed or equivalent material and work,
to the uses of the public. If then it is, in a sense, an owner, it is
an owner whose ownership is decidedly less in scope than ordinary
ownership. Its property is subject to an important servitude, or
better perhaps, its property is qualified by a simultaneous prop-
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erty of the state or county. The state has a right that the stones,
timbers, etc., shall not be withdrawn from its use, and that right
is a species of ownership. Not' far wrong, therefore, was the
master, in Somerton Turnpike when he said "'The road is a
highway, and if, in any sense, the road as a road, can be considered property, that property is in the commonwealth of Pennsylvania." If the turnpike company is to be compensated for
the road-bed, culverts, bridges, as property, iA must not be compensated for them except as a very peculiar kind of property;
except as that which it cannbt apply to other than the existing
use, viz that of travel, (a use beneficial to the public) and
that of earning tolls from the public's travel, (a use more or less
beneficial to the company). In brief, the property right of the
company is barely the right to earn money from travellers, for
the use of the road-bed etc.; not to use the road-bed, or its materials, in any other way. The material in the road-bed and the
labor expended upon it, have been made inseparable from the
land embraced in the way, and the company has only the right
to prevent travellers from driving along it unless they pay a fee,
and the right to make modifications in the road with a view to
the perpetuation of its fee-earning power.
Let us suppose, however, that there is no irrevocable dedication to the public, of the materials of the road-bed, culverts, etc.,
but that the company may lawfully remove them without furnishing substitutes. This is not a power additional to, but one
alternative to, that of allowing them to remain in the road. If
the company allows them to remain in the road, it may require
fees from those who use it. If it does not, it will lose the power
to exact tolls.' The value of its property in them is not the value
of its right to collect tolls by means of them plus the value of its
right to take them away and make other uses of them. It cannot do both. In making other uses, it sacrifices the toll-earning
use. The proper measure of the value of the constituents of the
road as such, is the value of its power to earn indefinitely, what
it will probably earn over and above concurrent expenses of officers, toll-keepers and repairs. It is a toll-earning unit. What
net tolls it will earn, will depend on the populousness of the
neighborhood, the existence of competing means of travel, the
travelling habits and necessities of the people on one side; and
Super 400.
'Cf. Act May 22d, 1878, P. L. 85; 2 Pa. L. Dig. 476o.
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on the other, the character of the soil, of the durability of the
material now composing the road- bed, the liability to overflow
from neighboring streams, etc. The proper measure of the
other values of the constituents of the road would be their market
value, after they have become separated from the road, less the
expense of thus separating them. The gravel and stones may
be scooped up and sold, the masonry of the culverts may be
taken to pieces, and the stones disposed of, the bridges may be
pulled down, and the timber, iron, etc., therein may be sold.
But in none of the cases has the value of the material taken
from the thus destroyed roadbed and bridges been adverted to
as that for which compensation is to be made to the company.
In most cases, that value would be comparatively insignificant.
In the cases in which the turnpike road is and visibly, will be
unable to earn enough to pay the expenses of maintenance, this
value of the -removed materials would be the only value for which
compensation could be made, and it could not be even then made
if the company has irrevocably dedicated them to the public, for
the sole consideration of what tolls it may be able to earn.
The material was probably worth more before it was put on
the road and into the culverts and bridges, than it would be,
when taken away; and the expense of putting it in its present
place may have been heavy, but this deterioration of value, is
the unavoidable incident of removal; and this expense of the
labor of construction of the road has been actually incurred, for
the sake of the power to earn tolls. The value of the road is
not the money expended, but the money which it will probably
earn, or the equivalent. In the expropriation of the company, it is
deprived of the power to earn this money. The value of it,
when its value exceeds that of the material, when separated and
taken away, ought to be the measure of damages; otherwise the
value of this separated material should be. It is an absurdity to
allow both values; still more, to allow the value of the earning
power, jblus~the value of the materials, considered as such, prior
to removal.
The right to earn tolls by means of a macadamized or otherwise paved road, presupposes the road. Let us call the right
the "franchise."
The earnings are due to the franchise, but
they are also due to the road. The franchise is not an absolute
right to collect tolls, but a right to collect them from persons
who use the road. The road Plus the right to charge for its use,
earns them.
What would the road earn without the right?
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What would the right earn without the road? They are plainly
indissolubly united in the process of earning, and it is idle to attempt to attribute one fraction of the earnings to one and another fraction to the other. If the road or its materials cannot
be used by the corporation otherwise than in the earning of tolls,
if they cannot be removed or applied to any other use, then the
effort to distinguish their value from that of the right of franchise to obtain compensation for their use, is futile. They have
no use but this; they therefore have no value but as toll-earner.
They cannot earn the tolls, that is, they cannot have even this
one use, without the right. The right confers on them the
power to earn. However, in Mifflin Bridge Co. v. Juniata County5
apparently without the disapprobation of the Supreme Court,
the trial court instructed the jury that they must find the value
of the physical structure [of a bridge] at the time of taking,. that
is, of the masonry, of the fill and abutments, and of the superstructure, "and to that" says the court, "you are to add the value
of the franchises." This is quoted, as if believed correct, in
West Chester, etc., Plank- Road Co. v. County of Chester'. If
A owns a machine, the only use of which permitted by the law,
(which use it exclusively possesses) is to let it out to as many as
want aid, and it will probably yield, on the average, during its
life of 20 years, $1000 per year, A, if he sold it with his right
to let it, would get what the probability of earning $1,000 per
year for 20 years would now induce a buyer to pay, and it would
be impossible to say that of this sum (let us suppose it $16,000)
the machine is worth $8,000, and the right to let it $8,000, or
the former $10,000, and the right to use it $6000. Having but
one use, the machine would be worth what this use was worth,
in money; that is, what the use would sell for; its earning power.
If the right to use it in this mode were dissociated from it, and
it was incapable of any other use whatever, whether because of
5144 Pa. 365.
6182 Pa, 40. In Perkiomen, etc., Turnpike Road v. Montgomery County,
21

Montg. 59, the court adopted three methods of ascertaining the value of

the turnpike (j) finding what the value of the materials and structures of
the road was, (2) finding what the stock was worth, (3) finding what the
earnings were. It found that,the result by these methods was substantially
the same. But, in applying the first method it completely ignored the franchises. It found that the physical road was worth as much as the stock
was worth or as much as the capital which, invested at nearly six per cent,
would produce the net income.

THE FORUM
legal prohibition or otherwise, it would have no value at all; not
even the value of scrap iron or brass.
If machine a could be replaced by machine b or c, or d, in
the exclusive function; and b or c, or d could be obtained for
say $4000, and if the function 'yielded an annual sum forever of
$400, the machine and function together would be worth, say
$6666.66 a sum which, invested at six per cent interest, would
yield $400; the machine, costing $4000 and replaceable at $4000,
might be said to be worth $4000, and the function, the franchise,
might be regarded as worth $2666.66. If the function however,
annually yielded only $200, and the machine, though it cost
$4000, could not be used except to perform this function, it would
be impossible to say that the machine was worth more than
$3333.33. No sensible pers6n would pay more for it. But the
fact is not to be obscured that the machine, costing what it may,
has no value whatever, apart from the one function to which it
is able, or is permitted to be applied.
This was said in substance by the master, Albert D. Wilson,
Esq., in Somerton Turnpikewho almost alone, of all that have dealt
with the subject has shown the slightest power to form a clear
conception of value, and of the indissolubility of its connection
with function. "As I read the charter" said the master to the
viewers, "in the light of these historical facts, the corporation
has the use of the land over which the road runs; it has the use
of the roadbed; it has the use of the foundation and surface
stones;, it has the use of its bridges, and that it has that use for
a single purpose, single so far as the corporatiou is concerned,
viz: the one use of taking toll from travellers who travel over the
road otherwise than on foot. The company would have no right
to take up the stones in the roadbed and carry them away, no
right to take away the bridges or take away or disturb or remove
any other equipment which the public uses in traveling over the
,road. The road is a highway, and if in any sense, the road as a
road can be considered property, that property is in the commonwealth of Pennsylvania. What you are condemning, if you condemn anything, is not lands and stones and bridges, but a franchise, a privilege; the privilege which this company has to collect toll from travelers."
When property is taken under the power of eminent domain,
the person or corporation suffering the ablation, must receive the
7z6

Super
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"value" of the property 8 what it is "worth," 9 and value, worth,
as the political economists tell us, is the power of a thing to purchase, to purchase other things, including money."0 The value,
the worth of a turnpike, is its power to obtain for its proprietor,
money, in the form of tolls for successive transient uses or in the
form of money as a price for its sale. The value of a steam engine is not the sum of the values of the various elements that
compose it, separately sold; but the money which, sold as a unit,
it will bring. That depends on the uses to which it can be put,
as a whole, or the uses to which, if it is disintegrated its parts
can be put. So the value of a turnpike is the value of the
whole, as a facilitator of conveyance, or the value of the parts
and components, if the function of facilitating conveyance is
abandoned, that is, the money which for either object, (but not
for both, since the objects are incompatible) it is able to command.
The turnpike must be in a certain condition, in order that
there should be a right to charge tolls for its use. If, at the
moment of acquisition by the public it is not in that condition,
but the expenditure of say $5,000 will be necessary to put it in
that condition, and if, in that condition, the probable net earnjugs for an indefinite time, will be, annually $1,000, and if a road
earning $1,000 per year, net, would probably sell for $16,666 this
road would sell for $16,666 less $5,000. If the road is built
of such material, or has been in use so long, or is exposd to
such destructive agencies, like floods, as will probably require
large average annual expenditures in order to maintain its
earning power, one who bought the road would understand
that its net earnings per year would be less than were these
facts different, and would pay correspondingly less for it. Hence
it is always proper to show the present condition of the
road; e. g. that it is out of repair, that it has "but a thin
and irregular supply of hard material on its surface; that it has
ruts and inequalities."
"The value of such a property as a
a whole" says Green, J., "depends largely upon its physical condition, for the purposes for which it is intended, and proof of the
condition, therefore, is proof as to value."' 1 - This probably is
8

West Chester etc. Co. v. Chester County, 182 Pa. 40. Somerton Turn-

pike, i6 Super 4oo;. Chambersburg & Bedford Turnpike Co., 2o Super 173.
9In re Kensington Turnpike Co. 97 Pa. 26o.
'0 MiOl, Polit. Econ. p. 265.
"West Chester etc. Plank Road Co. v. Chester County, 182 Pa. 40.
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what is meant by Orlady, J., by the expression, "the structural
value of the property;" its "structural condition."'"2
The length of time during which the company will have the
right to earn tolls will manifestly, affect the price which a buyer
would pay for the road. If, -inorder to avoid a forfeiture of the
right, it is necessary to double the length of the road by addiltional construction, that circumstance -would- affect the preseht
value of the franchise, and consequently of the property. 3 That
the turnpike has already lost the right to take tolls may -be
shown; but it is not* competent to show the passage of an act
(e. g. that of April 12th, 1851, P. L. 498) making it unlawful
for the turnpike company to erect a gate within' one mile of the
city of Reading (within which mile is the, part of the turnpike
road which is undergoing condemnation) unless-it also appears
that the existing gate at which tolls are colledted within this
mile was erected since the passage of the act, the act not being
retroaqtive. 1'
The existence now, or possibly in the future, of rival roads,
that would attract travel which would otherwise have gone to
the road in question, is a fact to be considered. The road, however smooth and attractive, will enjoy less patronage when
other roads draw' to themselves a portion of the neighbbrhoodl
travel, than were it free from such competition. The same road,
costing $10,000 to build it, might,'without competitors, produce
net annual revenue equal to six per cent 'upon $20,000. With
competitors, it might yield six-per cent on only $5,000- -Its selling value would be less in the latter case than in the former, and
the damages allowable to the corporation; would likewise be less,
despite the identity of the intrinsic qualities of the road.'5
Possibly the existence of a right in an electric railway' com-pany to occupy, and its actual occupancy of a portion of the
breadth of the turnpike, for a part of its length, would, in some
way, affect the attractiveness of the- road for travellers, and
diminish its patronage. The competition of the iail-,ar would
certainly do so. The occupancy by the railway company iiay
at all events apparently be shown. Thus the jury, says-Mestre12Chainbersburg & Bedford Turnpike Co.,'2o Super 173.
3
M
West Chester, etc., Plank Road Co. v. Chester County, 182 Pa.
14Perkiomen, etc.,.Turnpike Co. v. Berks County, x96 Pa. 21r.

40.

"Chambersburg & Bedford Turnpike, 20 Super.'373, x8i. This'is what
Orlady, J., probably refers to, when he says that "the use of new roads'! is to
be considered in determing value.
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zat, J., is "enabled to determine any depreciation in the value of
plaintiff's road by reason of the construction of the electric railway upon it."' 6 The fact that the road is not of full legal width,*V
That the earning power of a road determines, at least in
part, its value; and therefore may be shown, either by the company, or by the county, is held in several cases. In West Chester, etc. Company vs. Chester County"6 Green, J., quotes with approval the instruction of the court below, "The jury will readily
understand that the mere possession of a roadbed without the
privileges of exacting toll w6uld be of but little account." Of
bridges, Paxson, J., said -Their value necessarily depends upon
their productiveness."'" Hence, the receipts of the road, at the
gates, for a number of years past, may be shown. ' The expenses
incurred in earning them, would also have-to be taken into account. "Net tolls" are mentioned by Ermentrout, J., as an
"element" to be considered." In Perkiomen, etc., Turnpike
Road vs. Montgomery County"2 the trial judge took into view the
fact that during six years preceding the proceedings to condemn,
the net receipts had been $8,520, or, on the average, per year
$1,420. The capital sum which investors would ordinarily pay
for such a business, earning so much, was found by him to be
about $25,000. In Chartiers & Robinson Township Turnpike
Road, financiers were called as witnesses to testify that, the
16Perkiomen, etc., Turnpike Co. v. Berks County, 296 Pa. 21. But, how
the depreciation was wrought, is not suggested. The offer of the county to
show an agreement between the turnpike company and the railway company that, whenever the latter wished to construct a second track, it should
pay the turnpike company $1500, for the purpose of showing what rights the
county acquires in the turnpike by -the condemnation proceedings was rejected, as irrelevant and immaterial, it already appearing that the turnpike
was encumbered with the right of the railway company.
and. that it would have to be widened, it is said, must be considered, in determining its value.' 7
7
tChartiers v. Robinson Township Turnpike Road, 47 Pitts L. J. 283.
16i82 Pa. 40. Cf. Mifflin Bridge Co. v. Juniata County, 144 Pa. 365Chambersburg & Bedford Turnpike Co., 20 Super. 173. Cf. In re Kensington, etc., Turnpike Co. 97 Pa. 26o, 277.'
"Montgomery County v. Bridge Company, ira Pa. 54.
2
OChambersburg & Bedford Turnpike Co., 2o Super. 173.
2
West Chester, etc., Company v. Chester Company 8z Pa. 40
:22 Mont. 59. But the court found that certain repairs to a bridge
ought to have been made in order to preserve the earning power and that
these repairs would have cosf$25oo. Instead of subtracting $25co from the
$8520 the income, he subtracted it from the $25,ooo, thus finding the.prop
erty to be worth $23,500.
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business yielding, net, $2,570 per year, the franchise and property
would be worth, assuming that the investment should pay 4/4
per cent, $60,000. The viewers, upon a 5 per cent basis, had
reached the conclusion that the property was worth $50,000.
It scarcely needs observation, that the net profits may vary
from year to year, and that it would be necessary to obtain an
average of the profits for a number of years prior to the condemnation. The income of the single year just before the proceedings, would be an unreliable foundation for an estimate."
There
is indeed, no certainty, there is only a probability, that the road
will cQntinue in the future to earn yearly as much as it has on
the average, earned, in a period of even many years. Of the
strength of this probability business men must make such judgment as they can. Their willingness to buy the franchise and
property at a given price, will rest upon that judgment. The
viewers and jurors must act on similar principles. The element
of speculation is unavoidably inherent in the process of valuation.
From the net profits it is ordinarily the duty, and generally
the practice of corporations to declare and pay dividends. These
dividends would be prima facce evidence that at least their
amount had been earned above expenses. If the dividends are
small, or if there have been none25 this fact can doubtless be used
by the county as a species of admission that the road is unprofitable. On the other hand high dividends may be explained consistently with a comparatively small value of the road. In Perkiomen etc. Turnpike Road v. Montgomery County,26 the trial
judge finding that the dividends for nine years prior to the condemnation had averaged 8Y3 per cent per annum, and yet that
the stock whose par was $50 had, on the average sold for only $67,
discovered the explanation in the liability of the road to serious
injury from inundations from streams and rivulets, that is, the
continuance of net earnings so high was precarious.
2347

Pitts L. J. 283.

In In re Kensington etc. Turnpike Co., 97 Pa. 260,

Philadelphia, is said by Paxson, J., to have admitted that the road was worth
$61,5oo which value was based upon a capitalization of the average net income.
2None had been declared by the Chartiers & Robinson Township
Turnpike, 47 Pitts L. J. 283.
2621

M6nt. 59.
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From the court's or jury's or viewers' estimating, the value
of the road from its earning power, manifested by its net earnings through a number of years, which earnings are proved directly, or, by the declaration of dividends, indirectly, to the estimates of buyers, shown in the prices which they pay for stock,
the transition is easy. When A buys 20 shares of stock in a
turnpike company for $60 per share, he shows what he believes
to be the value of the property of the corporation, or at least,
what he believes that other people will be willing to pay for it,
should he desire to dispose of it. The fact, too, that B, the present owner, can sell it for $60 gives it for him, this exchange value.
The whole stock represents the whole property and franchise of
the corporation, and its value is their value. The fact that a
few shares are once sold at $60, would not justify the inference
that all the shares, put on the market at once, will bring $60,
but if shares from time to time sell for $.60, through a series of
years, it may be inferred that the whole would sell for nearly as
much. It is the act of the county which virtually requires a
simultaneous sale of the-whole stock, and probably for this
reason, it cannot take advantage of the depreciation that such a
sale would lead to, below the prices obtained for shares sporadically sold. It has been said by Paxson, J., in reference to the
condemnation of a bridge, "The property and franchises of the
bridge company, are represented by its stock, and the market
value of the stock may be said to represent the market value of
the property taken, as nearly as it can be ascerlained"." He had
however already said in another case' four years before in reply
to the contention of counsel that the road for which damages recovered had been $70,000, was nearly worthless because the stockholders had been willingto accept $20,000 for their stock, that one
corporation (the county of Philadelphia) could not take the property of another, (the turnpike company) without making compensation therefor, "because the stock of the latter has no market value, and the property itself is unproductive. The road of this turnpike company was a visible tangible thing. It was property which
necessarily cost said company a large amount of money. It was
worth to them just what a jury would, give them in this proceeding
in the absence of any false testimony or improper conduct to influence the award, It was worth to the city the amount it would have
cost the latter to have graded and macadamizd the road as it
2

TMontgomery County v. Schuylkill Bridge Co. iio Pa. 54.
Inre Kensington & Oxford Turnpike Co. 97 Pa. 260.
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was when taken. I say this without indicating what was the
true measure of damages. That question is not raised by this
record. The worth of the road to the city might not have been
the proper rule for the jury in making their award."
But if the
question was not raised by the record and if he was not ready to
adopt the value to the city as the test why did he suggest in reply
to the point that the damages $70,000 were in excess of the actual value, and that the stockholders' willingness to sell the
stock was evidence of this, that the turnpike company might be
entitled to what the road was worth to the city? Why instead
of laying down a rule by which the estimation by the jury, of
value, should be guided, did he say that the value was whatever
the jury should give in the absence of false testimony, [false testimony about what?] or improper conduct to influence them?
Since the owners of the stock are the owners, practically, of both
the road and the franchises. concerned in its operation, the value
of the whole stock is their value. The prices people are willing
to pay for the stock may not be its value if by value is meant
something else than what can be obtained for it in exchange.
This willingness might be the result of ignorance of the character
of the road, of its real earning power, in consequence of which
the price people are willing to pay may be less or greater than
they would pay, were the actual facts known. There Is always
a possibility that the price people are ready to pay for a thing is
not what they would pay for it, did they know the facts, but
nevertheless, if they are willing to pay a certain sum for it,
it is not improper to say that it is worth to the owner that sum.
Justice Paxson's opinion that the market value of the stock represents as nearly as it can be ascertained, the market' value of
the property taken, is correct, if by value is meant the exchange
value, i. e. the prices that are got, when the stock or property is
sold.'" If the prices at which shares sell during five years preceding the condemnation range from $60 to 74.50, the average,
viz $67 may be taken as a measure of value."
2
1This is also said in Chambersburg & Bedford Turnpike Co., 20 Super.
173, Montgomery County v. Bridge Co. i io Pa. 5; Cf. Allentown etc. Turnpike Co. v. Lehigh Valley Traction Co. 174 Pa. 273; a case in which damages to a turnpike company for the occupancy of its road by a traction company were assessed.
:OThe market value of the stock is said to be one of the best tests of
the value of the road and franchises in Perkiomen, etc., Turnpike Road v.
Montgomery County, 21 Mont. 5o. Cf. 2o Super. 173.
3121 Mont. 59.
As there were but few sales, the court considered along
with this average price, the appraisement of its shares, made by the company, and returned to the auditor general during the preceding five years;
viz. $65, and found the shares to be worth $66.
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When only a very small part (viz 2200 feet) of the turnpike
(23 miles long) is undergoing condemnation, the court properly
rejects evidence of the value of the shares, unless the character
and productiveness of this part and of the other parts of the road,
are shown, because the value of the shares would not assist in
determining the value of the part taken."
The company's own opinion of the value of its shares is admissible at the instance of the county, for the purpose of confining the damages to equivalence to this value. The returns
made under oath by the officers of the corporation, to the auditor
general for the purpose of taxation may be regarded as returns
made by the corporation and the stockholders. While these returns do not "conclude" the company, it is not merely competent
but also important evidence for the consideration of the jury.2
It need not be the sole evidence and if other evidence of value is
before the jury that evidence must be considered no less than
The returns, though made
the official returns of appraisement.'
under the influence of a desire to lessen the taxes to be imposed
on the corporation, do not estop the company from proving that
the value is in fact greater.5 The returns put in evidence should
be of comparatively recent years. Those made during the ten
or less numbers of years preceding the condemnation may be
proved." The proceeding taking place in 1894, the defendant
may put in evidence the returns made in 1893, and those of 1888
and 1889, without those of the intervening years. "'Each return," says Green, J., "is independent of the others and speaks
for itself. If ift was an admission against interest, it was admissible for that reason, and its competency would not be destroyed or affected because there were other returns for other
years."7
The turnpike company has the right to operate the road
and to receive tolls. The value of this right cannot be measured
by the selling value of the materials of the road, separated from
the right to keep them in the road and to collect tolls for the use of
it, or by the cost of these when they were procured, or by what
32Perkiomen, etc., Turnpike Road v. Berks County, 196 Pa. 21.
-33West Chester, etc., Plank Road Co. v. Chester County, 182 Pa. 40.
342o Super. 173.
35West Chester, etc., Company v. Chester County 582 Pa. 4o; Miffin
Bridge Co. v. Juniata County, i44 Pa. 365.
38Chambersburg & Bedford Turnpike RoAd, 20 Super. 173.
"in82 Pa. 40.
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would be their present cost, were they now procured. A road
costing $10,000 .might be able to earn, above all'expenses, $2,000
a year. It is evident that to deprive the company ofrthe road
would be to deprive it of the power to earn; the measure of the
loss of which would not be what Ihe road cost, or would not
cost. When the county takes the road, it must pay not merely
what that road is worth to it. It might be able to build, another
road for one-half the value, to the company.. of the road taken.
This would not exempt itfrom paying that value. "The county
may have made a mistake," said Paxson, J., in a bridge condemnation case,, "the bridge may not be worth -to the county
what the jury have fixed as the damages. The county might
perhaps have built a new bridge at another street for half the
money, but it did not do so; it elected to take the property of the
bridge company, and the inquiry under such circumstances is not
what it is worth to the party taking, but its value to the company
that is deprived of its property. '' .If the turnpike were Worth
more to the county than to the company, the former would not
be under a duty to pay, to the latter, the. greater sum.
The original cost of the road to the company is-not necessarily
nor ordinarily equal to the present value of it. The right to collect
tolls contributes to the value of the entire-property; or rather, has
a value, which may be, greater or less than the cost. The cost
might have been greater or less than it ought to have been.
The road may have depreciated since. A
As when it is less, the
company is not confined to it, so, when it is greater, the county
will not be compelled to pay it. However,. there may be a certain
likelihood that the cost bears some relation to the present value,
and for this reason, the original cost of construction may it is
said, be considered by the jury as an indication of that value.
In Chambersburg & Bedford- Turnpike Company," the ,master
told the viewers, using a phrase that, does, not dazzle by its
luminousness, that they could consider, along with the road's
receipts, the value of'. the stock as sold from time to, time, the
value of stock returned to the auditor general, etc, ',,such evidence as to cost of construction as may-bear on.the value of the
property as relatedto its earning capacity.-,' It is proper to in38Montgomery County v. Bridge Co. ixo Pa. 54; Chambersburg & Bed
ford Turnpike Road, 20 Super. 173; Somerton Turnpike 16 Super. 400
Turnpike Co. v. Clarion County, 172 Pa. 243; Mifflin Bridge Co. v. Juniata
County, 144 Pa. 365. Cf. In re Kensington, etc. Turnpike Co. 97 Pa. 26o.
392o Super. 173.
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form the jury that, "while considering the-original cost of construction, they are "not to be controlled" by it."
What would be the cost of the road if it were being built at
the time of the condemnation, ought, it would seem, to be deemed
the present value of the physical road, and in so far as the
present value of the physical road enters into the present value of
the whole corporate property, it should be a guide to the value of
that property. It is hard to see how therefore, the master's instruction, in Chambersburg & Bedford Turnpike Road"1 is correct
that the value of the -property "is not to be ascertained by the
present cost of the physical structure considered in connection
with and in addition to the value of the franchises," if the value
of the physical road added to that of the franchise, is the value
of the property. The price at which men in the business, would
sell the material and labor embraced in the making of a turnpike,
ought to be deemed the value of the turnpike as a physical thing.
If men generally, having a horse of a certain kind and quality will
sell him for $200 and no less, hnd if men generally, desiring such
a horse will pay $200 for him and no more, the horse will be
worth $200. But the master denying the identity of this cost
with value, instructed the viewers that the cost could be considered only as it bore on the value. "It is a question of value.
What is the road' worth? Not what it cost1 42 In Somerton
Turnpike,'4 one Of the points, which it was apparently error for
the master to refuse to affirm, was, that the value of the roadbed
etc., to the company and 'not their value to the city of Philadelphia, was to be considered, "that is, what it would cost the
company immediately before the taking to construct the same
roadbed, bridges and toll-houses, in the same condition as they
are now, and in the same place," "apparently error," we say,
for the case is so ill reported that it is difficult to say what is affirmed and what condemned as error by the superior court.
40
West Chester, etc. Co. v. Chester County, r82 Pa. 40.
412o Super. 173. In Perkiomen, etc, Turnpike Road v. Montgomery
County, 21 Mont. 59, the court in estimating the value of the physical road,
ascertained the number of cubic yards of the various sorts of stones in the
road, and estimated what they would cost and the cost of putting them in
the road,
at the time of condemnation.
4'2But the point which the master is answering, does not request him to
say that what the road "cost" must be considered as determining value but
'.what it would cost to place the roadbeds, culverts, bridges and toll-houses
in the condition in which they now are." Orlady, J. understands the
master to refer to the original cost of the roAd.
43x6 Super. 400.
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The turnpike company maintains toll-houses. These become useless, with the abrogation of the duty of users of the road
to pay. If the company has the right to remove them, notwithstanding the condemnation, not their value, but the difference
between their value, as standing, and their value as removed,
should, on the principles applied in the cases, be allowed for.
But, it has been said that the turnpike cannot be taken without
the toll houses, standing within and therefore a part of the road,
and therefore they must be considered, in estimating the damages, as constituents of the road taken." The master, in Somerton Turnpike 5 said that "the company can take away the tollhouses, toll-gates and outhouses appurtenant", but for. some
reason, not apparent, he stated that to the value of the company's
privilege of collecting tolls, was to be added, as damages "the
value of the one, two, three or four toll-houses, toll-gates and
outhouses-longside of the portion so condemned." If the tollhouses are not "within the right of way" acquired by the turnpike company, the condemnation, says Orlady, J., does not take
them from it. -"They are not only outside of the strip 50 feet
wide, on which the road was built, but title to them was acquired
46
by the company for its convenience, by independent purchase."
But they may suffer depreciation in value, by the severance of
the ownership of them from that of the road, and for this depreciation the company must be compensated. 7 Precisely why allowance should be made for any depreciation, or rather, how
there can be any depreciation, is not apparent. The company
has a right to collect tolls. In order to collect tolls it must employ a gate-keeper. His residence at the road will be a conven-iei2ic.
It therefore erects the house. But this is an expenditure
ineurre4 in order to collect the tolls, and the company gets the
equivalentof the tolls which in the future it would collect, in the
damagea which embrace the value of the franchise. The present
worth of the future tolls is the same thing as the future tolls.
"Norristown, etc., Turnpike Co. v Mon'tg. 19o.
4516

Super. 400.

4Cfimbersburg & Bedford Turnpike Co., 20 Super. 173; York &
Gettysburg Turnpike Co. i8 York, 49. If a house erected on a contiguous
lot has a porch which projects across the boundary of the road, the porch
will have -to be removed, 'and damages must be allowed for this injury to
the rouse; 18 Yorlk 49.
4
rChambersburg & BedtorA Turnpike Co., 20 Super. 173. The value
of a tolI-keeper's dwelling house and fot n-tis the road will not be allowed.
Norristown, etc. Turnpike Co. 6 Montg. 19o.
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The turnpike may lie in more than one county. No one
county can cause the condemnation of more than so much of it
as lies therein; nor therefore can be compelled to pay for any
other part. 8 Even the whole of the part of a road in one county
need not be condemned. Obscurely it is stated by Orlady, J.,
that the character and productiveness of the whole road and of
lhe Partaffected by the condemnation proceedings, are shown,
in order to assist the jury in determining the value of the part
comdemned as compared with the whole road 9 but if the character and productiveness of the part taken, are known it would
seem to be unimportant whether these of the restareknown or not.
If we knew what the physical constituents of 10 miles of a road
of 30 miles, are worth, and what the right to charge on these
10 miles is worth, it hardly seems necessary to bother ourselves
with finding what the physical constituents of the whole road,
and the franchise to collect tolls tolls on the wnole road are
worth. If the value of the whole road is known, that of a
part may be inferred by reference to the ratio of the length of
the part to that of the whole, to the comparative amounts of
travel on this part and on the west of the road, etc. From the
worth of the whole capital stock cannot be inferred the value of
the part taken unless the productiveness and character of the
other parts known.'
IsFactoryville, etc. Turnpike Co. road, i9 Super. 613; York & Gettysburg Turnpike Co., 18 York, 49. In Chambersburg & Bedford Turnpike
Co., 2o Super. 173, a road 55 miles long extended through Fulton and Bedford counties. The part of it lying in Bedford county was condemned.
Cf. Somerton Turnpike, 16 Super. 400.

Super. 173.
Perkiomen etc. Turnpike Co. v. Berks County, 196 Pa. 21.

492o
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MOOT COURT
HOOD vs. ALLINSON.
Title to Land-Marketability-Enforcement of Contract for
Sale of Land.
STATEMENT OF FACTS.
Jacob Hood purchased a tract of land and paid $100 on account of the
purchase price. Before the execution of the deed and the delivery of the
same, Jacob Hood died, leaving a will in which he bequeathed all his personal property to his wife Jane, and all his real estate to his son William.
Abram Kress, the vendor, petitioned the Orphans Court for specific performance of the said contract, and was authorized by said court to deliver to Samuel Hood, the executor of Jacob Hood, the deed for the said
tract of land on payment of the balance of the purchase money. Samuel
Hood paid the balance of the purchase money out of the personal estate
in his.hands and received a deed in which the grantee was named as
"Samuel Hood, Executor of Jacob Hood, Deceased."
William Hood immediately went into possession of the said property and has continued in
possession until the present time, a period of six years. Samuel Hood
died January 5th, 1905. William Hood has contracted to sell the said
tract of land to John Allinson but Allinson declines to perform the contract on the ground that William Hood does not have a marketable title.
This is a bill for specific performance.
Atkins for the Complainant.
The mere possibility of an adverse claim is not sufficient to render a
title doubtful and therefore unmarketable.
Bispham, Equity Article
380.
Temko for the Respondent.
A purchaser of real estate can not be compelled to accept a doubtful
title, but may compel the conveyance to him of an indubitable title.
Swayne v. Lyon, 67 Pa. 43; Clouses' Appeal, 192 Pa. 111.
OPINION OF THE-COURT.
BUSHMAN, J. :-Where a binding contract is made for the sale of
land, from that instant a conversion takes place. The purchaser is regarded for many purposes as the owner of the land; and if the purchaser
die before conveyance, his heir will take the land and the executor will be
obliged to pay the purchase money. Bispham's Principles of Equity 451;
Rose v. Jessup, 19 Pa. 280; Nagle v. Ingersoll, 7 Pa. 185. The Orphan's
Court has jurisdiction, by virtue of the act of Apr. 28, 1899, P.L. 157, to
compel the executor of the deceased to pay over to the petitioning vendor
the balance of purchase money, and require vendor to make title as it,
the Orphans Court, should direct. Through this decree of the Orphans
Court, William Hood came into possession of the land but was given no
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more title than he had; before he had an equitable title with legal title
in the vendor, and now he has possession and an equitable title with
legal title in Samuel Hood.
The court directed the vendor to transfer title to Samuel Hood, the
executor of Jacob Hood,-why not to Samuel' Hood, teamster for the late
Jacob Hood? Because the Samuel Hood, who was then the executor of
Jacob Hood, was the person the court wished to hold the title, and this
man was pointed out; he was first designated as the executor, etc., so
the vendor would not mistake the person. So title was directed to and
vested in Samuel Hood, executor of Jacob Hood, deceased, but we cannot
believe he took title other than as trustee for William Hood, for what
would he be doing with it as executor?
An executor never touches the land of his deceased unless commanded
to do so in the will, or by the Orphans Court when a sale is necessary to
pay debts. This executor was not authorized by the will to do anything
with the land, nor was he directed by Orphans Court to sell any of it to
pay debts; but that Court did have title put in Samuel Hood to hold for
William Hood.
By virtue of his office he has no right to the title, so he must hold as
trustee.
But this is a passive trust and by the doctrine of the Pennsylvania
cases, is at once executed. ' It was said in Bacon's Appeal, 57 Pa. 504,
"No formal conveyance of the legal title is necessary to put the entire
estate in the cestui que trust, but we have in some cases decreed conveyances in order to dissipate a useless cloud upon the land and make the
property more marketable." The Court did not say the title wouldnot be
marketable without such conveyance, but expressed a doubt of its marketability and that doubt is felt, and expressed in all the cases. Rife v.
Geyer, 59 Pa. 393; Chamberlain v. Maynes, 180 Pa. 39, McFadden v.
Drake, 74 Pa. 473; Dodson v. Ball, 60 Pa. 492, Nice's Appeal, 50 Pa. 143;
Schenley v. O'Hara, 27 Pitts L. J. 184, Lowrey v. Lowrey, 8 Phila. 105.
If the courts feel doubtful about the marketability of a title when
that question is not squarely before them, must they not feel very doubtful about it when it is the point at issue? And a vendee is entitled to a marmarketable title, free from reasonable doubt; Clause's Appeal, 192 Pa.
111, Herzberger v. Irwin, 92 Pa. 48; Swayne v. Lyon, 67 Pa. 436.
Altogether this discussion is not necessary, for our decision must follow Murray v. Ellis, 112 Pa. 485. There it was held, "that when the legal
title to land is outstanding in a naked trustee, who may be compelled to
convey at any time, the title is not a good and marketable one; and an
action on a covenant to convey a good and marketable title cannot be
maintained by the vendor upon his tendering a deed for said land with
said legal title outstanding."
The death of the original trustee, Samuel Hood, cannot alter the case,
for upon his death the legal title descended to his heir. Cornplanter v.
Evert, 3 Yeates 570.
Therefore the petition of William Hood is dismissed with costs.

THE FORUM
OPINION OF THE SUPREME COURT.
Allinson cannot be compelled to accept and pay for a piece of land
the title to which, made by the conveyance to him, will be fairly questionable and disputable. Such a title would be incompatible with any sense
of secureness of ownership, would leave a question in Allinson's mind,
which would interfere with his improving it. It would raise such a doubt
in any purchaser's mind as would debar him altogether from purchasing,
or dissuade him from purchase except at too low a price.
The learned court below in a lucid and persuasive opinion, has reached
the conclusion that Hood's title is not marketable. The purchase money
still due by Jacob Hood, upon his contract with Kress, Was directed to be
paid by Hood's executor out of the personalty left by Hood at his death.
This money was paid, and the deed was made not to William Hood, as it
should have been, but to, "Samuel Hood, executor of Jacob Hood, deceased." The legal title is in Samuel Hood, till his death. It is now in
his heirs if not in his successor in the administration of Jacob Hood's estate. The learned court below, relying upon Murray v. Ellis, 112 Pa. 485,
has concluded that the separation of the legal from the equitable title,
renders William Hood's title unmarketable although the trust in Samuel
Hood, executor, is apparently passive. Cf. Elliott v. Tyler 5 Cent. 543.
We are disposed to hold that the mere fact that the legal estate was
in Samuel Hood would not render the title unmarketable if the evidence
were clear, and very easily attainable, that he had no equitable interest in the land, and would at the suit of the cestui que trust, be certainly compelled to make a eonveyance to the latter. Had it appeared in
the records of the Orphans Court that Samuel Hood paid the balance of
the purchase money from the personal estate of Jacob Hood, and that
the object of the conveyance to Samuel was to vest the estate in such person
as would be entitled to the land, under the will of Jacob, in short that
Samuel Hood had no equitable claim upon the land, no substantial question would have existed, as to the full ownership of William Hood. Titles
resting on phrases in a will, may be marketable, although it is always
possible for some one to question the .interpretation of them. Title by
statute of limitation may be marketable, although it reposes on facts
which may need proof. Pratt v. Edy, 67 Pa. 396; Dallmeyer v. Ferguson,
198 Pa. 288. There is always a possibility that a deed, under which the
vendor claims, was procured from the grantor therein, by fraud, Stobert
v. Smith, 184 Pa. 34, but such possibility would not render the title unmarketable. The fact that a vendee might be put to some trouble in
hunting up evidence of facts to support his right, were it questioned in
any litigation, or in any negotiation for the sale by him of the land, is
not decisive that the title lacks marketability. Had the records of the
Orphans' Court shown all the fa~ts that establish the nakedness of the
legal title of Samuel Wood, Allinson we think, would be compellable to
accept and pay for the land. As it does not appear that these records
disclose these facts, nor how with certainty, these facts could be established by Allinson, in case of need, we accept the decision of the learned
court below.
Appeal dismissed.

THERORUM
SHADE vs. A. SHADE'S EXECUTORS.
Divorce-Recognition in other States.
STATEMENT OF FACTS.
Abram Shade was married in New York and lived there with his wife
for two years. They then quarrelled and he moved to Ohio, where he
was granted a divorce for her desertion, process being served on his wife
only by publication.
The wife sued for a divorce in New York for his desertion, and was
granted one, process being served constructively only upon the husband.
The husband has died leaving land in Pennsylvania and the wife mentioned claims dower.
Coursea for the Petitioner.
A decree of divorce will not be considered as valid, where the respondent resided outside the state and was not served personally with
process, or was not present at the proceedings. Lukes v. Lukes, 14 W.
M. C. 306; Davis v. Davis, 12 C. C. 541; Elder v. Reel, 62 Pa. 308.
Sharman for the Respondent.
A wife who obtains a divorce whichis not recognized in another state,
is nevertheless estopped from claiming dower in that state by reason of
her attempt to throw off the matrimonial ties. Richardson's Estate 132
Pa. 292; Atherton v. Atherton, 181 U. S. 155.
OPINION OF THE COURT.
KLEEMANN, J:-The husband and wife, each in a separate action,
procured a divorce by constructive notice in the state in which he and
she respectively resided. No question can arise concerning the right of
the state of Ohio within its borders to give effect to the decree of divorce
rendered in favor of the husband by the couyts of Ohio, he being at the
time domiciled in that state. As New York was the domicil of the wife
and the domicil of matrimony, it clearly results that the domicil of the
wife continued in New York when her husband left, and no question can
be raised concerning the right of the state of New York to grant the divorce. According to Atherton vs. Atherton, 181 U. S. 155, and admitted
to be the law by Justice White in Haddock vs. Haddock, 26 Sup. Ct.
Reporter 525, a divorce granted in the state of the domicil of matrimony
to the party residing there is valid and enforceable throughout the Union
even though the respondent was not within the jurisdiction of the state
and had no actual notice of the pendency of the action. In view of this
decision, we are impelled to decide that the divorce which the wife obtained in, New York, in the state of the domicil of matrimony, is valid
and should be recognized in our courts in bar to her right of dower.
This case in our opinion, is governed by the principles of law as laid
down in Atherton vs. Atherton. In the recent case of Haddock vs. Haddock, supra, Justice White distinguishes that case from Atherton vs.
Atherton, and thereby implies that the latter is not overruled by the
former.
We are of opinion that the procurement of a divorce by the wife in
the state of New York was such an act as estopped her from claiming a
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dower interest in Abram Shade's property. The case is closely akin in
principle to Richardson Estate, 132 Pa. 292, where a decree of divorce absolute was entered in a foreign jurisdiction, at the suit of the husband,
and the wife subsequently married, and never after made claim upon her
first husband, who himself subsequently twice married without objection
on her part. She was estopped from claiming as his widow on the 'istribution of his estate, although the decree of divorce might have been
avoided at the proper time on her application. The claimnant here repudiated the marriage relation, so we think she is estopped by her conduct.
We deem it our duty to give-full faith and credit to the decrees of theother states. In Maynard vs. Hill, 8 Sup. Ct. Reporter 23; it was decided
that "the right of another sovereignty exists, under principles of comity,
to give to a decree so rendered such efficacy as to that government may
seem to be justified by its conception of duty and public policy." If we
refuse to give full faith and credit .to the decrees of the Courts of New
York and Ohio, because the party libeled, had in each instance,,their domicil in another state, and-was not within their jurisdiction, we refuse to accord to the decrees of those courts the efficacy we claim for our own, when
liable to same objection.
The petition for dower is refused.
OPINION OF THE SUPREME COURT.
The plaintiff's right to dower-depends on her having been the wife of
the decedent down to the moment of his death. Two divorces have been
exhibited: If either of them is valid, her dower has perished with the end
of the matrimonial relation.
The parties were married in New York and after marriage resided
there two years. He then deserted her, going to Ohio. In that state he
obtained a divorce on the ground that she had deserted him. She was
not otherwise served with notice of the proceding, than by publication.
Such a divorce is regarded in Pennsylvania as void. Fyock's Estate, 135
Pa. 522; Platt's Appeal, 80 Pa. 501; Colvin v Reed, 55 Pa. 375. It is
regarded in New York also as void, a respects the libellee, who resides
in that state. People v. Baker, 76 N. Y. 78; Re Kimball 155 N. Y. 62;
Cf. also, Haddock v. Haddock, 201 U. S. 562. Ohio had become the
domicile of the husband, but it was never the actual or constructive
domicile of the wife. He adopted it as a home, in the effecting of the
desertion of the wife. She did not reside with him; nor did he permit
her to reside with him.
The wife continued, as during the cohabitation, to reside in New York,
after the desertion of her husband. Could she in that state effectively
divorce herself from him, he becoming a party to the proceeding, if at
all, only by reason of the fact that he -was called- in by publication? A
wife may acquire a domicile separate from that of her husband, when
his fault compels or justifies such acquisition. Haddock v. Haddock, 201
U. S. 562; Cheever v. Wilson, 9 Wall., 108; Atherton v. Atherton, 181
U. S. 155; Hunt v. Hunt, 72 N.Y. 217. In this case, the wife simply
retained the matrimonial domicile, when, in deserting her, the husband
had renounced it. Under such circumstances, the courts of New York
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had jurisdiction to decree a divorce, which should be valid not merely in
New York; but in any other state of the Union. In Atherton v. Atherton,
supra, the husband had remained in Kentucky, the domicile of the two
during matrimony, while the wife had gone to New York, her former
home. The husband obtained a divorce in Kentucky, and it was held
that the courts of New York were bound to recognize its validity. In the
case before us, the wife continues at the matrimonial domicile, the
husband, while changing his personal domicile, refusing to permit her to
go with him. It would be impossible to give less effect to the divorce
obtained by her, than to that which Atherton obtained.
But, whether the full-faith and credit clause of the constitution of
the United States compels Pennsylvania to recognize the validity of the
New York divorce or not, neither it nor any other provision in that
instrument forbids such recognition. A just policy requires, as the
learned-court below has said, that full effect be here given to the New
York decree.
Judgment affirmed.

COf1iONWEALTII vs. W1. SHUFIAKER.
Divorce-Bigamy-Statute of Limitations.
STATEMENT OF FACTS.
Wlliam Shumaker left his wife in Carlisle in 1887 and removed to
Kansas, where in 1890 he was granted a divorce a vinculo. In 1892 he
remarried and has two children. The Kansas court acquired jurisdiction
by constructive service by publication merely. In 1906 Shumaker
returned to Carlisle and has taken up his residence here with his second
family. This is a prosecution for bigamy.
Bigelow for Prosecution.
Bigamy defined: Act of 1903 P. L. 102.
Bigamous marriage may take place outside the state where the
indictment is found. Com. v. Bradley, 2 Cush. 553; State v. Palmer, 18
Vt. 570. Statute of limitations did not take effect until defendant came
within the jurisdiction of the Pennsylvania courts.
Otto for defendant.
Bigamy not a continuing offence. Comm. v. McNerry, 10 Phila. 206.

OPINIOi OF THE COURT.
RODRIGUEZ, J. :-Under the decision in Haddock v. Haddock, 26
(U. S.) Supreme Court Reporter 525, it is clear that the divorce obtained
by Shumaker in Kansas is unenforceable in Pennsylvania. In this case
it was held by the Supreme Court of the United States, that the mere
domicile within the state of one party to the marriage does not give the
courts of that state jurisdiction to render a decree of divorce enforceable
in all other states by virtue of the full faith and credit clause of the
Federal Constitution against a. nonresident who did not appear and was
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only constructively served with notice of the pendency of the action. Our
own decisions in Pennsylvania are to the same effect, and our courts have
refused to recognize jurisdiction in the courts of other states to dissolve
the martial relation in such cases. Reel v. Elder 62 Pa. 308; Colvin v.
Reed, 55 Pa. 375; Dorsey v. Dorsey, 7 Watts 349.
In Colvin v. Reed, supra,Justice Agnew speaking for the court, puts
up this very significant question: "Supposing that the State of Iowa,
on an ex parti proceeding or a proceeding when notice is given only by
publication, can make the divorce effectual to protect the husband within
its jurisdiction from all civil and criminal proceedings founded on the
marriage, and can regulate the descent and succession of his property in
the state, discharged from the claims of the wife, yet can this effect be
made extraterritorial upon any correct principles of universal application?" Then he goes on to decide that the decree could not have such
extraterritorial effect. It will be marked that he thought it could not
prevent a criminal prosecution founded on the marriage, outside of the
state of Iowa.
It is also clear that Shumakers's second marriage in Kansas is a valid
one in that state in as much as the decree of divorce granted in Kansas
is effective there. Haddock v. Haddock, supra. We, therefore, have
before us the case of a man, who, having married in Pennsylvania, goes
into another jurisdiction and marries there, the former marital relation
still existing.
The act defining and punishing bigamy is to the effect, "that if any
person shall have two wives or two husbands, at one and the same time,
he or she shall be guilty of a misdemeanor."
Act of March 27th 1903, P.
L. 102. By the first section of this act, the words "husband" or "wife"
are declared "to include any person who has gone through any form of
marriage with any other person, which form is recognized as binding by the laws of the place where such form is used." This shows
that a second marriage, in a state other than Pennsylvania was contemplated as having the same effect of a second marriage here, and does
away with the contention that because the second marriage took effect in
Kansas, the crime, if any, was committed against that state, and that
therefore this court has no jurisdiction.
The argument was made that since the second marriage occurred
in 1892, the statute of limitations is a bar to this prosecution. But the
statute never began to run until the defendant came within the jurisdiction of this state, and hence the prosecution is not barred. Act of March
31, 1860, sect. 77 P. L. 427.
We hold, therefore, that the defendant is guilty of bigamy.
OPINION OF THE SUPREME COURT.
Shumaker left his wife in Carlisle in 1887. By this we understand
that he deserted her. After residing three years in Kansas, he there
obtained a divorce from her, in a proceeding to which she was not
otherwise made a party, than by publication. The learned court below
has well concluded that that divorce, whether valid in Kansas or not, is
deemed void by the courts of Pennsylvania, and that in so deeming it they
are within their right under the Constitution of the United States. That
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the decree is valid in Kansas, is conceded by Haddock v. Haddock, 201
U. S. 562, though somewhat inconsistently, for virtually denying that a
divorce is a proceeding in rem, it cites with approval Pennoyer v. Neff,
95 U. S. 714, where it was held that a decree or judgment in personam,
the defendant not being in the state jurisdiction otherwise than by publication, is void, not only elsewhere, but even in the state where it is rendered. It ought to follow that even in Kansas the Carlisle wife of
Shumaker continues to be his wife. A divorce affects the relation between
two persons. It would be absurd to say that for Shumaker, it caused him to
cease to be the husband, and her to be the wife, but that for her, even in
Kansas, it left him her husband and her his wife. A relation cannot be
broken as to one of the related tings, and not broken as to the other.
But, whether Haddock v. Raddock is sensible or not, in conceding
validity in Kansas, to the divorce there granted, it holds, and not irrationally, that the divorce is not valid in Pennsylvania. Here, the Carlisle
wife is the only wife. Shumaker's relation with the other woman, is
adulterous and bigamous.
He is however, not indicted for adultery, but for bigamy, and it is
plain that unless he has been guilty of the bigamy in Pennsylvania, he
cannot be properly convicted here. Com. v. Huckel, 4 Pa. C. C. 576.
The act of March 27th, 1903 punishes the going, by a person already
married, "though any form of marriage recognized as binding under
the laws of this Commonwealth," and this act must occur in this state.
The second marriage of Shumaker occurred in Kansas.
The act of 1903 also apparently punishes, as for a distinct offense any
person who "shall have two wives or two husbands, at one and the same
time."
A person cannot have, in any civilized jurisdiction, two legal
wives or husbands. This phrase occurred in the 34th section of the act
of March 31st, 1860, into which it had been transferred from earlier
legislation. It has been held that this language does not make the
having of two husbands or wives, criminal, but merely the contract of
marriage with a second man or woman; that the offense is not a continuous offense, but-transitory; complete the instant the contract is made,
irrespective of any future cohabitation. Gise v. Com. 81 Pa. 428.
It follows that the sentence of the learned court below must be
reversed.
PHILIP MORRISON vs. JAMES JACKSON.
Sale of Future Interest In Land.
STATEMENT OF CASE.
John Morrison left at death an estate of at least $50,000, the income
of which was to be paid for 10 years to a brother. The estate was then
to be divided between two nephews, John and Philip Morrison. Within a
year of the decedent's death, his nephew Philip. offered his interest in the
estate for sale to James Jackson for $38,000. Jackson declined to pay
more than $30,000. Philip, who was 25 years of age at the time, after
deliberating for a week, accepted the offer and executed a formal as-
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signment of his interest to Jackson. The ten yearshave elapsed, and the
estate is now undergoing distribution. Both Philip and Jackson claim his
former share.
'Fr&ierick for Plaintiff.
A sale of a contingent or expectant interest in land is valid in Pennsylvania. Patterson vs. Caldwell, 124 Pa. 455; Powers Appeal, 63 Pa.
443.
Hummel for defendant.
OPINION OF THE COURT.
COOKE, J. :-Philip Morrison had a present right to a future enjoymentof one-half of the estate of at least $50,000 which John Morrison, deceased, left by his will. His estate was vested immediately on the death of
the testator and attached as a debt upon all of his real and personal property. Chandler v. Dinkle, 4 Watts 143; Rudy's Estate, 6 Pa. Dist. 246.
It is true that he could not enjoy this estate until ten years after the
death of John Morrison, but his right was one which could not be defeated. If he chose to do so, he could sell this estate, and if there was
no fraud in the transaction, the purchaser would receive the interest which
he, Philip Morrison, had. The fact that another had a preceeding estate
for years would make no difference. Davidson v. Little, et. al., 22 Pa.
245.,
The facts in Steele's Estate, 12 Pa. C. C. 496, were very similar to the
case at bar. There,,under the will of a father, a sonwas entitled to part
of the proceeds of certain real estate, after a life estate. During thelife
of the life tenant the son assigned his interest in the estate for a sum.
Later, the life tenant died.- On distribution of the estate both the -purchaser and son claimed the son's portion. The Court held that the purchaser was entitled to the, fund. The Judge, in commenting upon Davidson v. Little, et. al., supra, said: "In that case reference is-made to the
English rule which sets aside a sale by an heir, of an expectant interest
at a grossly inadequate price. That rule, however, does not apply in this
state to a person sui juris, having even a contingent remainder in land or
personal property."
Much less would it apply in the present case where the remainder in
one-half the estate "of at least $50, 000" was not contingent, butvested.
In Pennsylvania a person sui juris owning a contingent remainder in land
or in personal property, may sell the same for such sum as may be agreed
upon between himself and the purchaser provided the former does not
stand towards him in a trust relation, and in making the purchase acts in
good faith. Whalen v. Phillips, 151 Pa. 312; Ruple v. Brindley, 91 Pa. 296;
East Lewisburg L. & M. Co. v. Marsh, 91 Pa. 96; Power's Appeal, 63
Pa. 432, Patterson v. Caldwell, 124 Pa. 445; Wickersham's Appeal; 18
W. N. C. 36.
As Phillp Morrison was of age at the time he assigned his interest
and as no fraud appears, we do not see any grounds upon which he can
claim the legacy which was left to him by the will of John Morrison,
deceased. Hence, distribution of his legacy must be made to his
assignee.
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OPINION OF THE SUPREME COURT.
The estate of John Morrison was worth "at least $50,000," but how
much more, has not been made to appear. Nine years before it was
capable of being enjoyed by Philip, he offered his interest, then apparently
worth $25,000, for sale, and obtaining $30,000 for it, sold it. Its value has
since risen, but by how much is not apparent. The time for distribution
has arrived, and Philip seeks to annul his sale. Why should he?.
He was of age when he made it; 25 years old. No deception or undue
influence was practiced upon him. He offered to sell to Jackson; not
Jackson to buy from him.
Was the contract unreasonable? The apparent value of the interest
was the present worth of $25,000, a sum not greater than $20,000. For
this he got $30,000. Even had the bargain been unreasonable, the other
circumstances are wanting that would require a nullification of it. There
was no fraud on Jackson's part. Whelen v. Phillips, 151 Pa. 312; Robbins' Estate, 199 Pa. 500; Singer's Estate, 217 Pa. 295.
The fact that the enjoyment of the estate was to commence in the
future, was no obstacle to a valid sale. Even had the interest been
contingent, it could have been validly sold. Whelen v. Phillips, 151 Pa.
312. Had the period at which Philip was to have possession been indeterminate, had the commencement of the possession, e.g. been dependent
on the close of a prior life estate, which might fall in at any time, or
might be protracted through 30 or 40 years, the sale would have been
enforceable. Davidson v. Little, 22 Pa. 245. The commencement of the
possession of Philip was to begin at a definite time, and the contingency
that would have attached had it been dependent on a life, did not exist.
Jackson was clearly entitled to the share.
Appeal dismissed.

TEMPLE vs. TOOMBS.
STATEMENT OF FACTS.
Wm. Temple on April 1st, 1902, contracted to buy for $4000 a farm
from J. Salter, the money to be paid in four equal annual installments.
The first was made at the making of the contract. Temple took possession and retained it until April 11th, 1905. He then sold the land to
Toombs, his motive being his inability to make the payment due on April
1st, 1905. He received from Toombs $5000 for his'interest, which Temple immediately deposited in a bank. Temple died three days afterwards,
leaving a son James and his widow, Rebecca, to survive him. Without
administration his debts were paid out of the deposit in bank and the remainder thereof $4600 was divided between them, the widow getting
$1533.33. She brings dower unde nihil habet againstToombs.
Kleemann for Plaintiff.
The acceptance by a widow of her share of her deceased husband's
estate under the statute of distribution, is not an election such as will
estop her from recovering dower out of land which the husband had
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aliened in his lifetime. P. & L. Dig. of Decisions, Vol. 5 col. 7282; Leinaweaver vs. Stoever, 1 W. & S. 160 Gibson, C. J.; Borland vs. Nichols, 12
Pa. 38.
Hatz for Defendant.
The widow ought not to recover, because the defendant Toombs, did
not derive his title frorf her husband. At the date of the assignment by
Temple he had forfeited all his rights by failing to pay purchase price at
a stipulated time. Treasler vs. Fleisher, 7 W. & S. 137.
OPINION OF THE COURT.
COURSEN, J. :-Under the rules of the common law under which this
action of dower is brought, there-must be shown to have been: 1. A lawful marriage. 2. An estate of inheritance in the husband during coverture, coupled with seisin in law or in fact of the freehold. 3. Death of the
husband; in order that the common law dower shall attach. Shoemaker
v. Walker, 2 S. & R. 554.
The first and third requirements are conceded, therefore the only question to be determined is whether the husband, Wm. Temple, was seized
of an estate upon which dower could attach.
It is clear that no actual legal title ever existed in Temple, for there
is no mention of any conveyance to him, and it must be presumed that
none was made since the full purchase price was never paid, and there is
no mention of a purchase money mortgage or similar security being
given.
There remains then the equitable title and if we can consider Temple
as the equitable owner, the petitioner may recover her dower from the
land. Longwell vs. Bentley, 23 Pa. 99 says "A contract for the sale of
real estate is considered in equity as a conversion of land into money,
the vendor's interest becoming personality and ceasing to be realty, while
the vendee becomes substantially the owner of the estate." When a
contract is executed, lacking only the conveyance, we treat it as conveyed, Sutten v. Ling, 25 Pa. 466. The law as laid down there is sound
but we think we can so distinguish this case as to place it under the
authority of Pritts v. Ritchey, 29 Pa. 72. Longwell vs. Bentley and Sutten v. Ling supra, refer only to executed contracts, whereas the contract
in question is merely executory, for the stipulations in the contract have
never been complied with, there never having been a final. payment.
Even if the equitable title could be considered as complete and thus equivilent to a legal seisin, we believe it could not be available in this case
where there has been a failure ih the final payment according to the
stipulations of purchase.
Seisin is the completion of the investiture by which the tenant of the
freehold is admitted into the tenure; we do not believe such investiture has
occurred in this case.
The seisin must be considered as never having actually passed from
Salter, and Toombs merely holds the land as the assignee of Temple.
The petitioner cannot recover since there never was sufficient seisin
in her deceased husband to cause her dower right to attach.
Petition dismissed.
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OPINION OF THE SUPREME COURT.
That Temple acquired an equitable interest in the land by his contract
of purchase is indisputable. That a widow may have dower in such equitable estates is equally so. Shoemaker v. Walker, 2 S. & R. 554; Reed
v. Morrison, 12 S. & R. 18; 1 Tiffany, Real Prop. p. 432. Had Temple
completed the payments due on his contract of purchase, so that he could
have compelled the delivery of a deed, his widow would doubtless, have a
right to dower in the land. He however, had not completed the payments. He was unable to complete them, and for this reason, he sought
to sell and sold his interest to Toombs. Under such circumstances, the
law does not embarrass him by attaching to the land an interest in the
wife, who might make it impossible to extricate himself from his predicament by selling his interest to another, by refusing her consent to such
sale. Junk v. Canon, 34 Pa. 286, and Pritts v. Ritchey, 29 Pa. 71, cited
by the learned court below are warrant for this view.
Toombs paid to Temple $5000 for his interest, that is, for the land,
subject to the duty of paying Salter $3000. Toombs paid therefore $8000
for land for which Temple had agreed to pay $40U0. Temple had paid but
$1000, and yet he obtained $5000 for the incipient interest thus acquired.
The $5000 were deposited in a bank. Out of them Temple's debts were
paid, and the residue was divided as personalty, between Rebecca and her
son, she obtaining one third absolutely. Had Wm. Temple retained the
land, she would, have been entitled to one third of it but for her life.
Knowing as she did that the bank deposit was paid by Toombs upon the
contract, Mrs. Temple ought to be estopped, having taken one third of it
absolutely, from claiming any interest in the land.
Judgment affirmed.

BOOK REVIEWS.
Suretyship and Guaranty, by FRANK HALL CHILDS.
Publishing Company, St. Paul, Minn., 1907.

West

This, the latest of the horn book series, will maintain the excellent
reputation of that series. That the topic is an important one may be
judged from the amount of litigation turning upon it. The surprising number of 5400 cases are cited in the book.. The subdivisions of
the subject are logical. The treatment of each, while succinet is entirely
intelligible to the attentive reader. The style is crisp, luminous and interesting. In a somewhat extended examination we have discovered but
one matter worthy 'of adverse criticism; and that is the distinction drawn
on pages 7-10 between suretyship and guqrinty. The difference made between these two undertakings by the decisions of Pennsylvania is not
adequately portrayed in the author's statements. For class use the work
is well, adapted, and its patronage by the schools giving courses on this
subject, founded on text books, will very likely and very deservedly be
large.
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The Law of Evidence, by JOHN J. MCKELVY, 2d edition.
West Publishing Co., St. Paul, Minn., 1907.
No branch of the law is more important than that of evidence. Law
becomes living, only when facts are made to appear, and the rules which
control the causing of them to appear, are therefore of paramount importance. There are many excellent text-books on the subject: Wigmore's work on the 16th Boston edition of Greenleaf is epoch-making.
There are, however, certain inconveniences connected with the use of
Greenleaf as a text in law school work, which it is needless here to specify.
It lacks unity. Its discussions are at times too difficult because too abbreviated for the ordinary student. Some of its pages are overloaded
with citations. McKelvy's book is of moderate size. It does not attempt
to cite all or even most of the pertinent decisions, but only a few from
the various jurisdictions. Its statements of principles are clear and brief.
It is not a mere syllabus of conclusions, but reasons are invariably suggested in justification of them. By this means the principles of evidence
cease to seem arbitrary and artificial. An insight into the reasons of
their adoption makes the scope clearer. Mr. McKelvy's discussion of
opinion evidence, of admissions, of presumptious, and of hearsay may be
mentioned as very satisfactory. If his explanation of the burden of
proof might be justly criticized, he may say, in defense, that it is the
same, in substance, as has been accorded by eminent jurists and textbook writers. In conclusion it may be safely said that the mastery of
the contents of this book, would give to any lawyer, an admirable preparation for the tasks of trial and of counsel. It is an excellent treatise.

Private Corporations, by WM. L. CLARK, JR., 2d Edition by
FRANCIS B. TIFFANY. West Publishing Co., St. Paul, Minn.,
1907.
Clark's work on Corporations has been for a number of years in use
in many law schools, and by many lawyers. It has proved to be a most
excellent treatise on the great outlines of the law of corporations. We
know no serious rival in its special field. The style is clear; the arrangement philosophical, the proposition accurate, the citations ample. A few
points have been more fully developed in the adjudications since the first
edition appeared. It has been the object of Mr. Tiffany to exhibit the
results of these developements in the second edition, without changing
needlessly, the original test. Like all his work, this has been very satisfactorily done. In its present form, the book is admirably suited to the
needs of law school instruction. But, not to these needs only, for the
practicing attorney will find answers to three-fifths of all questions concerning corporations which vex him. The work will prove worthy of the
continuance of the patronage that it has heretofore enjoyed.

